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ESTABLISHING A FOCAL POINT FOR FLOOD PREPAREDNESS
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of a permanent focal point for flood 
preparedness and emergency response requires careful consideration. 
Planners must first define the elements of the total response and the 
systems necessary to implement the various preparedness plans before 
selecting the ministry or office where the focal point will be 
established. It is also important to consider the implications of 
locating the management function in various offices.
CONSIDERATIONS
It should be recognized that no single ministry or agency can 
effectively implement all the elements of a complete disaster 
preparedness program. It should also be recognized that in the 
course of preparing for and responding to a flood emergency, the type 
of inputs required change substantially. As the emergency evolves 
through its phases, the needs and types of inputs change as follows:
The Pre-Disaster (Preparedness) Phase:
Planning: Initially, flood preparedness is a planning function.
The preparedness agency carries out a wide variety of studies, 
develops implementing arrangements, and focuses on overall 
management concerns.
Technical inputs: As soon as the overall plans have been
defined, there will be a flurry of technical inputs centered 
around the flood warning system. These will include flood 
warning, computerization of critical data, and development of a 
geographic information system <GIS> based emergency information 
system.
The Emergency Phase:
Operational inputs: During an actual emergency, operational
considerations become predominant. Flood fighting, evacuation, 
search and rescue, support of evacuees and isolated populations 
require management by an agency with established internal, 
communications, strong logistics capabilities, and the ability to 
mobilize and support a wide range of heavy equipment 
simultaneously throughout the affected areas.
Relief inputs: During and immediately after the emergency, the
inputs change to social and humanitarian. The survivors require 
a wide range of temporary support ranging from food and shelter 
to short term economic assistance. The agency in charge at this 
point will need to coordinate and work through a variety of 
social service organizations, both government and 
non-governmental.
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The Post-Disaster Phaser
Reconstruction: During the reconstruction period, economic
assistance takes precedence. Programmes must be deueloped to 
provide a wide range of loans and grants to the affected 
populations in all major sectors such as housing, agriculture, 
small enterprises, medium and large enterprises, etc.
Coordination with lending institutions and the sectoral 
ministries is a prime requirement and the authority in charge 
must haue strong capabilities to undertake a uariety of economic 
analyses.
From the aboue, it should be apparent that it would be very 
difficult to create one ministry with comprehensive emergency 
management functions: that emergency preparedness is a function of 
many ministries, departments, and agencies. It can also be seen that 
the overriding need is for a focal point to coordinate the full range 
of preparedness and response activities and integrate them into plans 
for each phase of an emergency.
OPTIONS
The following ministries or offices are usually considered for 
locating the central emergency preparedness and management authority:
—  president or prime minister’s office:
—  vice president’s office:
—  public works ministry
—  ministry of irrigation or water resources
—  ministry of Interior
—  ministry of local government and regional development
—  ministry of defence
—  ministry of housing and urban development
In some countries the government may have a special relief 
ministry or commission which may also be considered.
If flooding is regionalized or if a decentralized plan is being 
developed, provincial, district, or subdistrict governmental units 
may be considered.
Discussion:
fls a general principle, emergency management should remain in the 
hands of civilian authorities. This is not to say that the military 
does not have an important role to play, but the limitations of the 
military in meeting civil needs is important to recognize. The fact 
that the military becomes involved so often is because during an 
emergency their communications and logistics capabilities are often 
invaluable. The objective therefore should be to develop an 
effective role for the military based on these capabilities without 
surrendering total authority or control over to the defense ministry.
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The fact that so Many Ministries and gouernMent agencies will 
need to be inuolued argues for the coordinating function to be placed 
at a fairly high leuel in gouernMent. SoMe argue that the function 
should be established in the office of the chief executiue. The 
rationale is that since Ministries (and therefore Ministers) need to 
be coordinated and giuen directions, the authority to do so Must be 
place near the seat of power. fls a result of bureaucratic realities, 
howeuer, there are strong arguMents against this choice. The head of 
the preparedness office is rarely as senior or as powerful as the 
Ministers he Must coordinate and euentually, the Ministers and the 
secretaries of their Ministries will c o m c  to resent the preparedness 
office’s closeness to the chief executiue and euen create obstacles 
and obstruction to their work. (See Box 1 .>
Locating the preparedness office in a strong line Ministry is 
generally considered the best choice. Not only does the office and 
its functions becoMe less threatening to other powerful Ministers and 
secretaries, the office has a strong official to defend it, to 
propose and support its budget, and to protect it froM bureaucratic 
infighting. Bureaucratically, this arrangement puts preparedness at 
a leuel just below that of Ministry secretary —  high enough where 
coordination is Meaningful, but low enough to reMoue it froM Most, 
but neuer all, political infighting.
Some countries, recognizing the difficulty of putting all 
emergency functions under one office split the functions aMong two or 
three agencies, usually according to pre- and post-disaster phases. 
For exaMple, under such an arrangeMent the Uater and Irrigation 
Ministry night be in charge of flood forecasting and warning, an 
office in the Public Uorks Ministry Might be in control of 
euacuation, search and rescue, and post disaster assessment; while 
the Ministry of local gouernMent would be in charge of reconstruction 
planning and relief.
R final node! that some countries haue adopted, though usually as 
an interim solution, is to form a national flood comMittee Made up of 
Ministers and/or secretaries of the Major Ministries inuolued in 
flood preparedness and response and to prouide the comMittee with a 
full-tiMe, professional secretariat. The secretariat staff May be 
professionals specifically hired as eMergency Management staff or 
More commonly, a sMall perManent staff is hired and other personnel 
are seconded froM the line Ministries. (See Box 2. >
Box 1: Case Study
ADAPTING TO BUREAUCRATIC REALITIES: 
JAMAICA’S OFFICE OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
After a series of devastating floods in western Jamaica in 1979,, 
and recognizing the threat to the country from hurricanes, the 
government decided to form an Office of Disaster Preparedness and 
Emergency Relief Coordination <ODP>. Acting on advice from several 
major donors, OOP was placed in the Prime Minister’s office. The 
reasoning was that coordination of ministries would require the 
coordinator to be at a level in government. Since the only office 
higher than Minister was Prime Minister, it did not seem unreasonable 
that his office would be the best place. A very capable technical 
person was selected to head the OOP and the staff were soon housed in a 
building immediately adjacent to the Prime Minister’s offices.
It first become apparent that there was a problem when it came time 
to submit OOP’s budget. The Prime Minister, who remained distant from 
the normal day-to-day work of the office, was not in a position to 
defend the amounts requested and OOP’s budget was severely reduced.
The OOP staff began to encounter difficulties with the ministries 
they were to coordinate. In some cases ministry staff objected to 
extra demands from an outside agency, but worse, some ministers 
resented what they perceived as "junior staff issuing instructions in 
the name of the PM". The OOP staff were seen as upstarts —  people who 
had obtained power without the requisite seniority. As time went on, 
the ministries were not only generally uncooperative, in some cases 
they went out of their way to create obstacles.
Luckily, the Director of OOP saw what was happening. He approached 
the Secretary of the Ministry of Housing and Public Uorks and suggested 
that ODP be. moved into the PUD. Public Uorks was a powerful ministry; 
it controlled resources invaluable in an emergency, such as trucks and 
heavy equipment. It had boats, and most important, its own internal 
communications system. As part of the housing ministry, it worked 
closely with provincial and local governments and urban and rural 
housing agencies. There were also some administrative advantages —  
rather than fight for clerical support, vehicles and other equipment, 
OOP’s requests were lumped into the overall PUD budget and were passed 
without much debate. And having one of the most powerful permanent 
secretaries, not to mention a very influential minister, didn’t hurt.
Bureaucratically, the transfer removed some of the obstacles to 
effective day-to-day coordination. Relations with other ministries 
were carried out on a "horizontal" not "vertical" basis, i.e., by staff 
of equal rank. Uhile some territorial issues occasionally arose, for 
the most part they were easy to overcome.
To enhance OOP’s emergency management function, a National Disaster 
Committee was formed. The ministers on the committee made policy while 
their permanent secretaries coordinated operations. The prime minister 
chaired the committee while the ODP director served as secretary and 
chief of the emergency staff.
In 1988 Hurricane Gilbert struck Jamaica. Despite extensive 
damage, all agreed that ODP had prepared the country well and had done 
an excellent job in coordinating emergency operations.
Box 2 =
MEXICO’S OFEICE OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE: 
THE CORE STHFF RPPROflCH
In 1976, Mexico formed the Office of Emergency Response. The new 
director’s instructions were to minimize the hiring of new staff and 
to maximize coordination and participation of all the ministries.
The way in which he went about creating the office is considered an 
imaginative approach to establishing a disaster preparedness agency.
First, to provide policy guidance in an emergency, a national 
emergency committee was formed of the senior ministers and the chiefs 
of staff of the army and air force <the two services most needed in a 
major emergency). Several seats were left vacant so the president 
could appoint his personal representatives. The president presided; 
in his absence, the Secretary of Public Uorks chaired the meetings. 
The disaster management office was designated as the secretariat of 
the committee. During normal periods, it was to be housed in the 
public works ministry.
The most innovative feature of the office was the way in which it 
was staffed. The director chose what he called a "core staff" 
approach. In other words, only the director and a few administrative 
staff were hired as permanent staff, all. other personnel were 
seconded on one or two year assignments. The deputies were senior 
personnel from the line ministries. Technical staff were generally 
given longer assignments than administrative staff.
This arrangement had several major advantages. First, all 
ministries had significant inputs to the formulation of disaster 
plans. Uhile on secondment, personnel learned about the plans and 
how they worked, and could often make suggestions that improved 
coordination with their ministries. They were able to form 
integrated work teams that formed the basis for expanded task forces 
during emergencies.
Uhen the personnel went back to their ministries at the 
conclusion of their assignment, they became the links between their 
ministry and the disaster office. Therefore, coordination was made 
even more effective.
Getting staff seconded to the agency proved to be easier than had 
been expected: for some it was a chance to try something different 
uhile for others it was seen as a chance to demonstrate an ability to 
work at an interministerial level —  and thereby enhance one’s 
promotional chances. This latter motive was so strong that 
eventually, the office was able to insist that only high level 
administrative staff be seconded, ones who where on a career track 
that would eventually make them eligible for consideration as the 
senior civil servant in their ministry.
Finally, the core staff approach had one other advantage: it was
a relatively cheap way to staff the agency. In a country faced with 
a need for austerity, this administrative arrangement is worth 
considering.
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